Full FAA Chronology at this link.
19641110: FAA announced the results of a study concluding that neither eliminating nor limiting air-trip insurance would solve the airline sabotage problem. (See January 6, 1960.) The study was conducted for the agency by Clarence C. Pell, Jr., head of the aviation division of a New York insurance firm. In his view, the value of restrictions on air-trip insurance would be nullified by the availability of other types of insurance and by the irrational nature of airline saboteurs. These conclusions were in general agreement with those reached by the Government-Industry Steering Committee on Airline Sabotage on March 8, 1963.
19651110: New York’s La Guardia and John F. Kennedy airports were forced to shut down when the overloading of a switch at an electrical generating plant in Ontario, Canada, set off a chain reaction that caused a massive power failure in the northeast, blacking out for 13 hours or longer an 80,000-squaremile area. The power failure hit during the evening rush hour, but several factors combined to head off disaster: clear weather, a moonlit night, and the fact that FAA’s air route traffic control centers in the blacked out area continued to operate. Relying on secondary commercial suppliers, the ARTCCs guided aircraft to Newark, Philadelphia, Washington, and other airports not affected by the failure.
Prior to the blackout, the agency had believed that a standby engine generator was not as desirable as a second source of commercial power when two or more such sources were available, for the simultaneous loss of multiple sources was considered highly improbable. The power failure, however, demonstrated the need for generators at individual facilities. On March 2, 1966, FAA announced a program to install standby engine generators to power essential services at 50 airports in the contiguous United States. The 50 airports, chosen on the basis of their activity and location, would receive standby engine generators capable of powering a control tower, airport surveillance radar, approach-light system, instrument landing system, and runway lights on the primary runway.
The following year, FAA began planning a similar program for the air route traffic control centers. Over the past three years, ARTCCs had suffered more than 1,300 power failures lasting long enough to impair the operational use of critical equipment. Recognizing that power loss would be a potentially more serious safety threat in the future due to increased reliance on automation, FAA planned to equip all 20 centers in the contiguous U.S. with adequate auxiliary power sources and uninterruptible power units. (See June 27, 1969.)
19841110: FAA revoked the operating certificate of Provincetown-Boston Airlines (PBA), a large commuter carrier. The revocation was probably the most publicized of numerous operational curtailments enforced by FAA during the year, many as a result of the NATI program (see March 4, 1984). Critics charged that FAA inspections had failed to uncover PBA’s violations before information from a former pilot of the airline triggered the investigation that led to the grounding. After assisting PBA to correct deficiencies, FAA on November 24, 1984, recertificated the airline for that part of its operations involving smaller aircraft.
On December 6, 1984, the crash of a PBA Embraer Bandeirante (EMB-110) shortly after takeoff from Jacksonville killed all 13 persons aboard. On December 9, FAA issued an emergency Airworthiness Directive requiring owners to inspect key parts of certain Bandeirante models. The agency also dispatched a team to Brazil to work with authorities and the manufacturer to insure the safety of the aircraft type. On January 8, 1985, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommended that FAA ground many of the approximately 90 Bandeirantes in the U.S. pending further inspection and/or modification. FAA ordered the inspections, but allowed 18 hours of flying time prior to compliance. In its final report on the accident, NTSB listed the probable cause as a control system malfunction. The crew’s reaction to the problem resulted in overstress that caused failure of the horizontal stabilizer attachment structure.
New incidents and allegations in late 1984 and early 1985 resulted in further FAA surveillance of PBA. By May 1985, however, the agency was ready to recertificate the carrier for operation of its largest aircraft.
20031110: FAA proposed first-time regulations for extended aircraft operations (ETOPS), which would allow consumers to take advantage of new, more direct routes and more frequent trips on existing routes. If adopted, ETOPS rules would cover scheduled air carriers (Part 121) and charter operators (Part 135) and carry the full legal authority of a federal aviation regulation. Currently, carriers and operators complied voluntarily with FAA advisory circulars that governed ETOPS. (See February 15, 2007.)
20151110: The Department of Justice filed an anti-trust lawsuit with a federal court in New Jersey, alleging a recently proposed deal between United Airlines and Delta Air Lines to exchange landing and takeoff slots at Newark and JFK airports would expanded United’s dominant presence in the New York market at the expense of other carriers. (See January 8, 2015.)
20151110: A 10-seat Hawker H25 jet crashed into an apartment building in Akron, Ohio, killing all nine people on the plane but no one on the ground.
20161110: FAA Administrator Michael Huerta outlined the agency’s Caribbean initiative. Through this Initiative, FAA’s technical experts would work with their Caribbean partners and ICAO to increase airport safety and certification in the region and to improve air traffic flow management through collaborative decisionmaking.
Categories